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INTRODUCTION
MARC I. STEINBERG*
I am delighted to author the Introduction to this timely and im-
portant Symposium principally focusing on issuer disclosure obliga-
tions under the securities laws. With this issue, the Maryland Law
Review once again demonstrates why it has become one of the pre-
mier legal periodicals in the United States. During the recent past,
the Review has published contributions by the leading academicians
and jurists in this country on a wide variety of significant legal sub-
jects.' This Symposium continues that tradition,2 as will future is-
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Although I could have included several additional contributions to illustrate this
point, the following twelve Maryland Law Review articles provide ample support: Clark,
Why Does Health Care Regulation Fail?, 41 MD. L. REV. 1 (1981); Coffee, Rescuing the Private
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer As Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV.
215 (1983); Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REV. 193 (1982); Galanter, The Day
After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech:
The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4 (1984); Goldberg, Regulation of
Hostile Tender Offers: 4 Dissenting View and Recommended Reforms, 43 MD. L. REV. 225 (1984);
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); O'Connell,
From Doctor Johnson to Justice Holmes to Professor Laski, 46 MD. L. REV. 320 (1987); Simon,
The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985); Stewart, Reconstitu-
tive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86 (1986); Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureau-
cracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766 (1983); Zimring & Hawkins, A
Punishment in Search of a Crime: Standards for Capital Punishment in the Law of Criminal Homi-
cide, 46 MD. L. REV. 115 (1986).
2. The contributors to this Symposium include a federal district court judge,
respected academicians, and top-level Securities and Exchange Commission staff. Previ-
ous publications by the contributing authors include, for example: T. HAZEN, THE LAW
OF SECURITIEs REGULATION (1985 & Supp. 1987); M. STEINBERG, SECURITIEs REGULA-
TION (1986); Branson, Securities Regulation After Entering the Competitive Era: The Securities
Industry, SEC Policy, and the Individual Investor, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 857 (1980); Dennis, Valu-
ing the Firm and the Development of Delaware Corporate Law, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1985);
Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-The Federalization of
Corporate Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1 (1979); Hazen, A Look Beyond the
Pruning of Rule 1Ob-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L.
REV. 641 (1978); Hiler, Dirks v. SEC-A Study in Cause and Effect, 43 MD. L. REV. 292
(1984); Kerr, Suitability Standards: A New Look at Economic Theory and Current SEC Disclosure
Policy, 16 PAC. L.J. 805 (1985); Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State
Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689 (1981); Sporkin, SEC Enforcement and
the Corporate Board Room, 61 N.C.L. REV. 455 (1983); Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of
Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557 (1982); War-
ren, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C.L. REV. 495
(1984).
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sues of the Review.3
The subjects addressed by the contributions in this Symposium
are critically important to publicly-held enterprises, the investing
public, and the securities bar. Issuer disclosure practices have an
impact on the perceived safety and fairness of the American capital
markets. The tension exists between promulgating disclosure obli-
gations that facilitate investor and market confidence, yet are not
unduly burdensome to issuers. The accommodation of these some-
times conflicting interests within an equitable framework is a vital
component underlying the objectives sought to be achieved by the
federal securities laws.4
Although not addressing disclosure problems in particular,
Judge Stanley Sporkin appropriately leads off the Symposium with a
call for a new special study of the securities and financial markets.
In recent years deregulation, the boom in mergers and related ac-
quisitions, and the growth of trading in options and indexes have
led to rapid, dramatic changes in America's securities and financial
markets. In addition, the development of a global market for securi-
ties poses competitive challenges to this country's market system.
Citing these and other changes, Judge Sporkin calls for a new study
similar to the 1962 study that was commissioned by Congress and
directed by Mr. Milton H. Cohen.5
The 1962 study, which, among other things, was instrumental
in integrating the 1933 and 1934 Acts' disclosure standards, largely
focused on the internal workings of the market system. By contrast,
today's problems, according to Judge Sporkin, are primarily exter-
nal. To avoid the fate that has befallen other American industries,
and to preserve America's preeminent position in the global securi-
ties marketplace, he asserts that our securities markets must con-
tinue to command investor confidence; this is possible only if the
markets continue to ensure financial and disclosure integrity.
Judge Sporkin outlines several problems that demand serious
study. These problems include: the relationships between brokers,
bankers, and other players in the various financial sectors; the fi-
3. For example, the Fall 1987 issue of the Maryland Law Review will include articles
on constitutional law by Archibald Cox, Charles Mathias, Carl Rowan, Arthur Schles-
inger, and James Boyd White.
4. The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741
(6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987), scheduled to be decided in the
forthcoming term, highlights the importance of this subject.
5. Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (5 vols. 1963). See also Cohen, "Truth in Securi-
ties" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
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nancing of takeovers through the issuance of debt securities of less
than investment grade; issues of corporate governance, especially
the role that allegedly inept corporate management has played in
the decline of American industry; the suitability of the current mar-
ket structure to new trading vehicles, such as options and indexes;
and the respective roles that the federal government and the states
should play in policing the markets. A broad-range study of these
issues, Judge Sporkin concludes, is timely and necessary.
The Symposium thereafter turns to issuer disclosure obliga-
tions. An article which I coauthor with Mr. Robin Goldman pro-
vides an examination of certain situations relating to an issuer's
affirmative duty to disclose material nonpublic information. In par-
ticular, the subjects addressed focus on an issuer's obligation to dis-
close merger negotiations, "soft" information, and "bad" financial
news.
Questions relating to an issuer's affirmative duty to disclose fre-
quently present the corporate lawyer with difficult counseling deci-
sions. These situations are not resolved by referring to specific SEC
disclosure rules, and the few judicial decisions rendered lack uni-
formity. This contribution provides a synthesis of the divergent
viewpoints and seeks to present a viable framework for analysis.
The next article by Professor Thomas Hazen argues that a safe
harbor rule allowing some degree of disclosure between "no com-
ment" and full disclosure is not acceptable in rumor control and
merger negotiation situations. As he points out, the current specu-
lative market environment, in which investors seek out "deals" that
will lead to quick profits, demands that companies follow a responsi-
ble disclosure policy to avoid the injection of misinformation into
the market.
Starting from the premise that the federal securities laws gener-
ally impose no affirmative disclosure obligation in the absence of an
SEC-mandated rule, a statement, or other affirmative conduct, Pro-
fessor Hazen observes that nondisclosure presents its own safe har-
bor: silence or "no comment." The formulation of a workable safe
harbor rule, permitting some disclosure short of full disclosure, he
asserts, would be impractical to devise because of the fact-specific
nature of materiality determinations. As importantly, such a rule
would necessarily redefine the traditional concepts of disclosure and
materiality. Professor Hazen concludes that the imposition of such
a mandated rule would permit the introduction of half-truths into
the marketplace and, thus, would serve merely to exacerbate current
market inefficiencies.
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In the next contribution, SEC General Counsel Daniel Goelzer
addresses when, if ever, confidential merger negotiations must be
disclosed if those negotiations have not yet resulted, and may never
result, in a definitive agreement as to the price and structure of the
transaction. The article first discusses the various securities law and
exchange listing requirements that give rise to a duty to disclose.
Next, Mr. Goelzer analyzes the split in the federal circuits, specifi-
cally discussing the bright-line, price and structure test adopted by
the Third Circuit6 and the rejection of that test in the Sixth Circuit. 7
He particularly examines the holding in Levinson v. Basic Inc. ,8 a case
that will be decided by the Supreme Court during the 1987 term.
Following this discussion, Mr. Goelzer explains the SEC's position
as set forth in its amicus curiae brief in Levinson.9
Thereafter, Professor Douglas Branson combines an analysis
and critique of the SEC's response to the Third Circuit's decision in
Heublein o with suggestions for the proper role of the Commission
in this area and possible courses of conduct for issuers in light of the
SEC's Carnation release." Professor Branson agrees with the Heu-
blein decision both on the question of when negotiations become
material, and on the issue of whether literally-true but incomplete
statements are misleading. He asserts that companies should be
free to make truthful, noncommittal responses in order to "test the
acquisition waters." Alternatively, some realistic limits should be
placed on damage awards to reflect more closely the culpability of
subject companies and their managements in light of the tremen-
dous pressures at play in this context.
The next contribution, authored by Professor Mark Sargent, fo-
cuses on the complex relationship of merit and disclosure regula-
tion under state "blue sky" law, emphasizing their functional
interdependence rather than their philosophical differences. He
goes on to demonstrate that the increasing importance of state dis-
closure regulation has generated new tensions in the relationship of
6. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1215 (1985).
7. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284
(1987).
8. Id.
9. For a summary of the SEC's amicus curiae brief, see ,ateiality ofPreinerger Aegoti-
ations Involves Balancing Test, SEC Tells Court, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 781 (1987).
10. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1215 (1985).
11. In the Matter of Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801 (July 8, 1985).
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federal and state securities regulation, with those tensions reflecting
fundamental problems in the allocation of regulatory responsibili-
ties between the states and the SEC. Professor Sargent concludes
with an analysis of possible solutions to this regulatory dilemma.
Professor Janet Kerr's article surveys "the legal mine field" of
soft information disclosure. Initially, her contribution examines the
SEC's policy on soft information disclosure in transition from pro-
hibitive to permissive. The Commission's approach in this area may
be viewed as fairly clear. The federal circuits' reactions to SEC pol-
icy, however, are diverse. Professor Kerr reviews each circuit that
has an established position on soft information disclosure. In the
course of this review, she brings order to the various views by set-
ting forth the fact patterns and legal reasoning of the major deci-
sions in this area. As she details, the circuits do indeed run the
gamut in their responses to the Commission's policy on soft infor-
mation disclosure.
In the Symposium's next article, Mr. Bruce Hiler, an SEC Assis-
tant Enforcement Director, explores the Commission's changing
policy concerning disclosure of soft information, focusing particu-
larly on earnings projections and asset appraisals, and the courts'
response to that policy. As Mr. Hiler points out, after initially bar-
ring the inclusion of such information on grounds of unreliability,
the SEC presently encourages the disclosure of soft information,
recognizing that market professionals and investors alike often view
such information as essential to informed decisions. In the second
part of the article, Mr. Hiler discusses the various sources of a duty
to disclose soft information and presents a proposed standard for
determining the materiality of such information. He bases this stan-
dard on the user-oriented approach enunciated by the Supreme
Court in TSC Industries 2  and the Second Circuit's prob-
ability/magnitude test in Texas Gulf Sulphur.'3
Professor Roger Dennis in his article also focuses on disclosure
of soft information. After reviewing the pertinent SEC and judicial
approaches, Professor Dennis examines the utility of the mandatory
disclosure framework, including the feasibility of applying this
framework to management projections. Upon analysis, he proposes
a limited mandatory disclosure system in this context. Projections,
whether positive or negative, he asserts should only be required to
12. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
13. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
912 [VOL. 46:908
INTRODUCTION
be disclosed in control transaction situations. In these settings man-
agement's incentive for selective disclosure is reduced, and the need
for the information (and its processing through securities analysis)
is high. In the negative projection case, Professor Dennis concludes
that unless a control transaction is pending, the benefits of a
mandatory system would not outweigh the costs, and thus the re-
quirement should not be imposed.
Rather than examining issuer disclosure obligations, Professor
Manning Warren in the next article in the Symposium addresses a
topical "insider trading" issue: namely, that of investment bankers
who allegedly, in breach of their clients' confidences, reap large
profits by trading on nonpublic information concerning their cli-
ents' acquisition plans. Professor Warren specifically focuses on the
question of whether the client in this situation has a private cause of
action for deception under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act 4 and rule lOb-5 promulgated by the SEC thereunder.' 5 Upon
analysis ofjudicial precedent, he asserts that there exist several ob-
stacles to the invocation of a private remedy in this setting. Profes-
sor Warren concludes that the misappropriation theory as
formulated by the lower federal courts' 6 works a serious distortion
of section 10(b) jurisprudence, and that congressional action is nec-
essary to provide private litigants with effective recourse under the
federal securities laws for damages based on misappropriation of
nonpublic information.' 7
The Symposium concludes with two Comments.'" The first
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983).
17. In the 1987 term, the Supreme Court is scheduled to rule on the validity of the
misappropriation theory under section 10(b) jurisprudence, at least to a certain degree.
See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666
(1986).
18. The first Comment is authored by Mr. F. Philip Manns and the second by Mr.
Ronald B. Lee. I am pleased that both of these Comments were initiated in my securi-
ties regulation seminar held in the fall semester 1986 at the Law School. A third Com-
ment authored by Mr. Lee Applebaum also was written in the seminar and has been
published in 46 MD. L. REV. 339 (1987). Mr. Applebaum's Comment was cited on three
separate occasions injustice Blackmun's opinion in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 55 U.S.L.W. 4757, 4763 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). In addition, four other superb papers written in the seminar will appear
in a forthcoming book. See CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN SECURITIES REGULATION (M. Stein-
berg ed., to be published by Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1988).
At a time in which law student writing has been subject to extensive criticism, these
papers provide ample support that there are many bright students whose written work is
excellent.
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contribution, after generally reviewing issuer affirmative disclosure
obligations, analyzes an issuer's "duty to correct." As the author ob-
serves, the central problem in this context involves the attribution of
unauthorized statements by corporate and extra-corporate parties
to the issuer. Such attribution is necessary for liability to attach to
the issuer under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5.
The author suggests that the courts should use tort liability princi-
ples to attribute statements by unauthorized parties to issuers in any
case in which the public might reasonably believe that the spokes-
person speaks for the issuer. The author suggests a framework for
determining liability due to the attribution based on the agency sta-
tus of the speaker and the affirmative steps that a company has taken
to inform the public as to who is authorized to speak.
The second Comment provides an overview of the various
measures of damages used by the courts when compensating a
plaintiff under the securities laws' antifraud provisions. As section
10(b) does not expressly provide for a precise measure of damages,
the courts must determine for themselves the appropriate measure
to be applied when a violation occurs. In the author's view, this has
resulted in a great deal of confusion, with a multiplicity of formula-
tions being used by the courts. Still, he maintains that such a case-
by-case approach may be necessary due to the complexity of the
area. Additionally, the author explores other issues such as timing
of valuation, determination of fair value, and consequential dam-
ages in relation to these measures. The ramifications and the pros
and cons of each measure are analyzed, and the author provides two
hypotheticals in an effort to clarify this area.
The provocative articles contained in this Symposium should be
a valuable resource for many years to come. The subjects addressed
are important to American business, our capital markets, and inves-
tor protection. I am pleased to be associated with this excellent
Symposium and I commend the Law Review and the contributors
for their productive efforts.
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